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Abstract: We are all guided by thousands of norms, but how did our capacity for normative 
cognition evolve? I propose there is a deep but neglected link between normative cognition 
and practical skill. In modern humans, complex motor skills and craft skills, such as skills 
related to toolmaking and tool use, are guided by internally represented norms of correct 
performance. Moreover, it is plausible that core components of human normative cognition 
evolved in response to the distinctive demands of transmitting complex motor skills and craft 
skills, especially skills related to toolmaking and tool use, through social learning. If this is 
correct, the expansion of the normative domain beyond technique to encompass more 
abstract norms of reciprocity, ritual, kinship and fairness involved the elaboration of a basic 
platform for the guidance of skilled action by technical norms. This article motivates and 
defends this “skill hypothesis” for the origin of normative cognition and sets out various 
ways in which it could be empirically tested. 
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1. The Skill Hypothesis 
 
We are all guided by thousands of norms, often without being able to articulate the norms in 
question. A “norm”, as I will use the term here, is just any standard of correct or appropriate 
behaviour. For example, when I take a seat in a lecture theatre, I tacitly choose from a range 
of appropriate options. I know, without needing to be told, that it would be inappropriate for 
everyone to sit in the back row, or for everyone to sit directly behind or in front of someone 
else when there are empty seats with unobstructed views. Yet I could never verbally express 
the full set of norms that guides my behaviour. 
 
In such cases, three key psychological ingredients are in place (Railton 2006; Sripada and 
Stich 2006). First, the agent reliably notices or anticipates failures to comply with the norm, 
in themselves or in others. Second, the agent feels affective pressure (for example, in the 
form of discomfort, shame or anger) to prevent or correct the departure from the norm. Third, 
the agent knows what to do to restore conformity in a way appropriate to the situation. This 
may involve correcting their own behaviour, correcting another’s behaviour, asking for 
forgiveness, or administering punishment. 
 
These capacities (to anticipate and notice norm violations, to feel moved to restore 
compliance, and to know what the situation requires) are core components of human 
normative cognition. They present a big evolutionary question: Why did we come to be like 
this? Why do norms guide everything we do? How did norms come to structure all human 
interaction? There is at least a large difference of degree here between humans and all other 
species, and perhaps a qualitative psychological difference (Sripada and Stich 2006; Machery 
and Mallon 2010; Kitcher 2011). 
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I aim here to make progress on this big question by presenting a package of ideas I call the 
skill hypothesis. The first part of the skill hypothesis proposes a psychological connection 
between normative cognition and certain types of practical skill: 
 
In modern humans, complex motor skills and craft skills, such as skills related to 
toolmaking and tool use, are guided by internally represented norms of correct 
performance.  
 
The second part of the skill hypothesis proposes that this psychological connection indicates 
a deep evolutionary connection between normative cognition and practical skill:  
 
Some core components of human normative cognition (in particular, the capacity to 
internally represent action-guiding norms) evolved in response to the distinctive 
demands of transmitting complex motor skills and craft skills, especially skills related 
to toolmaking and tool use, through social learning. 
 
In the next three sections, I motivate the skill hypothesis by showing how well it meshes with 
recent trends in the psychology of skill (Sections 2-3), by articulating its distinctive empirical 
predictions (Section 4), and by showing how it yields a plausible “how-possibly” account of 
the origin of normative cognition (Section 5). I then discuss how this account relates to others 
that connect the origin of normative cognition to mutualistic cooperation, altruism and 
punishment (Section 6). In the last section, I suggest some ways of testing the evolutionary 
part of the hypothesis against the archaeological record (Section 7). 
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The underlying motivation for the skill hypothesis is the idea that the central, unifying theme 
in human cognitive evolution is the cultural transmission of skill within and across 
generations (as defended by Sterelny 2012a). My guiding thought is that we will not 
understand the basic cognitive capacities involved in normative cognition, or their evolution, 
until we understand the role they play in regulating skilled action. My hypothesis emphasizes 
the role of normative cognition in craft skill and complex motor skill and postulates a close 
link between the origin of normative cognition and skilful toolmaking.1  
 
2. The Cognitive Dimension of Complex Skills 
 
Skill has often been portrayed, in philosophy, psychology and popular culture, as a 
“mindless” phenomenon in which performance, especially at the expert level, proceeds 
automatically without any role for cognitive control.2 The commitments of such a view are 
not easy to tease out, since there is no agreement on what is meant by “automatic” or 
“cognitive control” (Fridland 2017). A mild version of the “mindless” view simply posits 
that, when executing an expert-level skill, there is no time for every split-second decision to 
be preceded by explicit conscious reflection and deliberation. This seems undeniable, and I 
endorse it. A more radical version of the view posits that there is no room for cognition of 
any kind in the successful execution of expert-level practical skills: skill execution is 
	
1 Precursors to the skill hypothesis include Churchland (1996, 2000); Clark (2000) and Sterelny (2012a). 
2 See Fitts and Posner (1967); Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986); Dreyfus (2005); Schmidt and Wrisberg (2008); Di 
Nucci (2013). 
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cognitively impenetrable.3 This is in tension with the skill hypothesis. However, there is no 
good reason to believe this strong version of the “mindless” view.  
 
The notion of expert-level skill execution as cognition-free has recently come under sustained 
critical pressure.4 Moreover, it is strikingly at odds with the way experts at complex craft 
skills describe their own expertise. Consider, for example, the following report by the 
archaeologist Peter Hiscock, who is a skilled flint knapper: 
 
Knapping long and/or regular sequences is intrinsically a complex process that 
requires competency at a number of levels simultaneously: bio-mechanical capacity 
to strike accurately and forcefully; the capacity to anticipate and identify emerging 
problems in the specimen morphology and to apply an effective action from a 
repertoire of potential responses; the capacity to plan ahead, which involves mental 
projections of both future actions and predicted outcomes (Hiscock 2014, p. 34). 
 
More recent theories of skill allow that expert-level practical skill is not a wholly automatic 
affair. Although there are still many points of disagreement, there is a picture beginning to 
emerge from this body of work. It is a picture of at least some skills—in particular, complex 
	
3 Even if there were no role for cognitive control in the execution of an expert-level skill, there might still be a 
role for cognitive control in the early stages of skill acquisition. So, it would be possible to recast the skill 
hypothesis as a claim about the role of normative cognition in the early stages of skill acquisition. 
4 See Annas (2011); Christensen et al. (2014, 2015, 2016); Montero (2016); Pacherie (2008); Papineau (2013); 
Pavese (2015, 2016a, b); Rietveld (2008); Sutton (2007, 2013); Stanley (2011); Stanley and Krakauer (2013); 
Stanley and Williamson (2001, 2017). 
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motor skills and craft skills—as possessing a substantial role for cognitive control. I will 
argue that along with this role for cognitive control comes a role for normative cognition. 
 
What, then, is the role of cognitive control in expert-level skill execution? As a starting point, 
consider Christensen and colleagues’ (2015a) account of elite mountain biking. Their focal 
example is Kath Bicknell, an expert mountain biker. In advanced mountain biking 
competitions, competitors must adapt quickly to the challenges of riding an unfamiliar and 
difficult course, sometimes on an unfamiliar bike: a challenge that requires rapidly modifying 
one’s technique in the face of anticipated, idiosyncratic situational demands. Opportunities 
for practice runs are severely limited. Information about the course (for example, information 
about the location of upcoming obstacles such as rocks, and the best strategies for negotiating 
them) is obtained from a variety of sources: observation of the course, conversations with 
other bikers, and a handful of practice runs. All of this information (observational, 
testimonial, episodic) must be integrated with fluent skill execution. For example, Bicknell, 
anticipating a small rock around the next corner, having remembered it from a practice run, 
will very slightly adjust her steering and braking to navigate around it.  
 
It is implausible that this integration of situation-specific information with performance is 
achieved without the involvement of any higher cognitive processing. It is equally 
implausible that it is achieved through explicit planning, deliberation and reasoning during 
skill execution, when decisions must be made in tiny fractions of a second. Something 
intermediate between these extremes is involved: a mode of action control open to new 
information from a variety of sources, yet also closely integrated with fine motor execution. 
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Christensen et al. hypothesize that a skilled agent’s control of the bike on an unfamiliar 
course is achieved by means of a cognitive, model-based representation: a cognitive control 
model.5 A cognitive control model is a representation of the causal structure of a complex 
skill and the situation in which it is executed. The model mediates between explicit plans and 
low-level (cerebellar) motor control, representing “causal relations among performance 
parameters” that allow the individual “to flexibly and appropriately identify and influence 
[…] parameters in a particular situation”, in such a way as to “achieve key performance 
goals, such as smooth riding and positioning for upcoming obstacles” (Christensen et al. 
2015a, p. 344). To visualize intuitively the content of such a model, imagine a causal graph, 
linking direct handles of agential control (pressure on a pedal, distribution of the rider’s 
weight) to the expected effects on performance (the speed of the bike, the trajectory taken 
around a corner) given a particular situation (the gradient, the surface, the upcoming 
obstacles). 
 
Christensen and colleagues’ proposal falls within in a wider trend of positing model-based 
representations to explain motor control, going back to Conant and Ashby’s (1970) “good 
regulator theorem”. For more than two decades, it has been widely thought that motor control 
relies on “internal models” located in the cerebellar cortex.6 For example, when one grasps 	
5 There is a welcome convergence here with recent work in moral psychology, which has highlighted the 
importance of forms of model-based learning in norm acquisition (Cushman 2013; Crockett 2013; Cushman et 
al. 2017; Railton 2014, 2017a,b; Greene 2017). My claims in this section concern model-based action control 
rather than model-based learning, but there is consilience here: a model-based account of skill helps explain 
how the evaluative models posited by these accounts of norm-learning (on independent grounds) become 
integrated with fluent agency. 
6 See Wolpert and Kawato (1998), Kawato (1999), Wolpert and Ghahramani (2000), Frith (2012); Blakemore et 
al. (2000, 2001); Franklin and Wolpert (2011); Pickering and Clark (2014). 
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and lifts a cup, the gripping force applied by the fingers is precisely controlled to be just 
enough to hold the object in place at each moment. This precise control can be explained by 
positing an “inverse model” that computes the motor commands needed to achieve a desired 
result, a “forward model” that predicts future arm trajectories given motor commands, and a 
“grip controller” that computes required gripping forces given predicted arm trajectories 
(Kawato 1999). What Christensen et al. posit is a higher level of model-based control, 
probably dependent on the cerebral cortex rather than the cerebellum, in which a complex 
skilful activity embedded in a particular situation is modelled, allowing fine adjustment of 
technique to the details of the situation.7 
 
Like internal models, cognitive control models are predictive: they predict the way an action 
will unfold, given the current set of situational parameters, allowing comparisons between 
prediction and actual performance, with mismatches between prediction and execution 
informing future adjustments.8 But in contrast to cerebellar internal models, the agent has 
some degree of cognitive access to the parametric structure of the model and is able to make 
top-down, on-the-fly adjustments to the causal structure and parameter values.  
 
For example, when faced with an unfamiliar course, a skilled biker exploits information from 
multiple sources to calibrate her cognitive control model to the parameters of this bike and 
	7	The idea of positing intermediate-level predictive models, cognitively accessible to a greater degree than 
internal models, as a means of explaining the flexibility of proximate control, is originally due to Pacherie 
(2008).	
8 In this sense, the proposal in this section is broadly allied with the “predictive processing” movement (as 
documented in Clark 2015), but without being committed to any wider generalizations about the role of 
predictive processing in the brain.	
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this course, such as the softness of the suspension or the stopping power of the brakes 
(Christensen et al. 2015a, pp. 347-8). A well-calibrated cognitive control model then guides 
skill execution in high-performance runs. For instance, Bicknell, having integrated the 
upcoming obstacle into her control model of the situation, and having calibrated the model to 
this particular bike, will make a precise adjustment on the brakes well ahead of the obstacle 
to slow the bike, allowing a line around the corner that evades the obstacle.  
 
This picture of complex motor skill as action guided by a well-calibrated cognitive control 
model is summarised in the following initial account:9 
 
Agents who possess a complex motor skill or craft skill possess a well-calibrated 
cognitive control model that accurately represents those aspects of the causal structure of 
the situation relevant to successful execution of the skill, anticipates upcoming obstacles 
and problems, and predicts the flow of sensory feedback that will occur if skill execution 
is successful. 
 
3. The Affective Dimension of Complex Skills 
 
Norms are not yet in the picture. This, however, is only a starting point. The above proposal, 
which emphasizes the cognitive dimension of skill, omits the affective dimension. Skill leads 
to discontent when the agent falls short of the standard of performance implicitly encoded in 
the control model. An incorrect adjustment, leading to a mismatch between the predictions of 
the cognitive control model and the agent’s behaviour, feels wrong to the agent, 	
9 I exclude from the scope of the account purely mental actions, such as mental arithmetic, and basic motor 
actions that require no sophisticated cognitive control or situational awareness, such as clenching one’s fist. 
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independently of (and often temporally prior to) any physical discomfort the error may cause. 
Skill creates internal pressure to conform to an internalized standard of correct performance.  
 
Rietveld’s (2008) work on “situated normativity” is insightful in this respect.10 Wittgenstein, 
in the Lectures on Aesthetics (1966), urges us to move away from visualizing the paradigm 
case of aesthetic judgement as that of a passive observer looking at an artwork and 
remarking, “That’s beautiful”. He asks us instead to imagine a skilled architect inspecting a 
building under construction at his direction, looking at a doorframe and exclaiming, “Too 
low! Make it higher!” Wittgenstein’s architect is moved by a reaction of discontent on seeing 
the doorframe, and this reactive emotion is coupled with immediate knowledge of what must 
be done to remove it. 
 
Wittgenstein refers to this phenomenon as directed discontent: discontent directed towards an 
object, motivating a specific action to be performed on that object. Rietveld argues that 
directed discontent is a characteristic feature of all craft skill, not just that of a skilled artist or 
architect (see also Buskell 2015). It is unobvious only because it often occurs tacitly: 
Wittgenstein’s case, in which the architect makes an explicit exclamation, is an exception 
arising from the fact that he cannot personally implement the changes he knows to be 
required. In most cases, a skilled craftsperson will see a problem, feel directed discontent 
(some aspect of the situation will feel wrong), and make the necessary adjustments without 
explicit reflection, deliberation or speech. To possess a craft skill is, in part, to feel directed 
discontent when action falls short of what is required by the situation, and to feel moved to 
make the required improvements.  
	
10 See also Buskell (2015). 
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Directed discontent can be incorporated within a model-based approach to the psychology of 
skill by positing that cognitive control models are integrated with affect: they are such that 
certain types of mismatch between the actual performance and the predictions of the model 
are apt to trigger an emotional response, typically in the form of discontent, directed at the 
model parameters responsible for the mismatch.  
 
When a certain type of mismatch between prediction and execution would, if made, trigger 
affective pressure directed at the aspect of performance responsible for the mismatch, we can 
describe this mismatch as an error of performance by the agent’s lights.  
 
Now we are closing in on norms. For there will not be just one type of mismatch that, if 
made, triggers affective pressure to modify one’s technique. There will be a whole pattern of 
such mismatches. For an elite biker, approaching a corner too fast will feel wrong, motivating 
adjustment; too much pressure on the brake will feel wrong, motivating adjustment; steering 
that is too tight or too loose will feel wrong, motivating adjustment—and so on. Skill 
execution must take a very specific course (the skill must be executed “just the right way”) to 
avoid triggering any dissatisfaction. This pattern of mismatches implies a standard of correct 
performance by the agent’s lights. A cognitive control model implicitly encodes a standard of 
correct action. When the agent’s behaviour falls short of the implicit standard, the 
performance feels wrong and affective pressure to make an adjustment is triggered. 
Moreover, the more expertise a person has, the more exacting their implicit standard will be. 
In an expert, even tiny deviations from the right way of executing the skill cause the 
performance to feel wrong. 
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For example, we can think of a skilled craftsperson, such as a flint knapper, as tacitly guided 
by the norms of their craft. Even if the knapper does not have explicit, conceptual 
representations of these norms, has no prior grasp of them, and cannot articulate them, the 
norms may nevertheless be encoded implicitly in the pattern of mismatches between model 
prediction and actual behaviour that would, if made, make the performance feel wrong to the 
agent. These mismatches might be (as in the biking example) at the level of fine motor 
execution: a particular strike of the stone might feel wrong, as the stone fragments in an 
unexpected way. But in a complex craft skill like flint knapping, they may also occur at a 
higher, more zoomed-out level: the individual strikes of the flint may feel right in isolation, 
but the way the specimen is taking shape across a series of successive strikes may feel wrong. 
 
Taking all this into account, here is a proposal that summarises both the cognitive and 
affective dimensions of skill execution: 
 
Agents who possess a complex motor skill or craft skill possess a well-calibrated 
cognitive control model that accurately represents those aspects of the causal structure of 
the situation relevant to success execution of the skill; anticipates upcoming obstacles 
and problems; predicts the flow of sensory feedback that will occur if skill execution is 
successful; creates affective pressure to respond to mismatches between prediction and 
performance by adjusting one’s technique; and represents a norm of correct performance 
in the pattern of mismatches that trigger affective pressure to make an adjustment. 
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4. Testing the Role of Norms in Skill Execution 
 
What sort of experiment would test the hypothesis that expert-level complex motor skills and 
craft skills are guided by norms in the above sense? It is reasonable here to ask for more than 
subjective reports from experts, which are far from conclusive.  
 
First, let us consider what sort of experiment would support the model-based view of skill 
execution presented in Section 2. The main foil for the model-based view is the strong 
version of the “mindless” view on which expert-level skill execution is wholly automatic and 
fully independent of cognitive control. However, the lack of agreement as to what is meant 
by “automaticity” leads to some obscurity as to what it is that the strong “mindless” view 
posits and the model-based view denies. I rely here on the idea that one signature of cognitive 
control, as opposed to cognition-free automaticity, is the appropriate, flexible, one-off 
adjustment of technique, without extensive practice, in response to an anticipated demand 
imposed by this specific situation (e.g. what is around the next corner). 
 
When the contrast is set up like this, it is clear that the model-based view and the strong 
“mindless” view do not diverge when a skill is executed in easy conditions (i.e. when there 
are no idiosyncratic situational demands to anticipate) and when the situation is so novel that 
the agent is learning a brand new skill, not executing an existing skill (both views predict a 
role for norms, rules, and so on in these situations). The key, therefore, is to identify 
“challenging-but-normal” conditions in which the agent is clearly executing an existing skill, 
but doing so in a demanding situation (e.g. a competitive mountain biking tournament on a 
difficult course) (Christensen et al. 2016). The strong “mindless” view predicts that, even in a 
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challenging-but-normal situation, skill execution will be automated, and thus performance 
will not be impaired (and might even be enhanced) by engaging the agent’s general cognitive 
resources in a distracting task (such as remembering lists of numbers). The model-based view 
predicts, by contrast, that the agent’s performance in such a situation will be impaired by a 
distracting cognitive task. The prediction is testable but a systematic test has not yet been 
done. 
 
This would test for a cognitive dimension of skill execution, but not specifically for a role for 
normative cognition. This could be put to the test by looking for a differential performance 
impairment when the distracting task places demands on normative cognition (for example, 
the distracting task might involve making evaluations of others, or ruling on the severity of 
norm violations). The prediction is that, controlling for the general cognitive demandingness 
of the task (as measured when no practical skill is being executed), the effect on skill 
execution should be more severe when the distracting task is normative than when it is non-
normative.  
 
A second, independent testable prediction concerns the familiar phenomenon we might call 
“skill dumbfounding”. It is well known that skilled agents often struggle to articulate the 
structure of their skills verbally (this can be seen in post-match interviews after any football 
match), and also well known that people struggle to articulate the reasons for their intuitive 
normative judgements (Haidt 2001). But are the two abilities correlated across subjects? For 
example, do people with unusually good access to the structure of their practical skills also 
have unusually good access to the sources of their normative judgements? The skill 
hypothesis predicts such a correlation, on the grounds that both kinds of dumbfounding result 
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from the difficulties of translating a norm encoded in a model of a situation into a linguistic 
format. 
 
A third type of prediction concerns affective responses to norm violations and failures of skill 
execution. The skill hypothesis predicts a link between the way we respond to failures of 
skilled action and the way we respond to other types of norm violation. It predicts 
correlations across subjects: people who feel stronger affective responses to failures of skill, 
in themselves or in others (e.g. strong feelings of shame or anger), should also feel stronger 
affective responses to social norm violations in themselves or in others. 
 
5. The Evolution of Normative Cognition 
 
So far, I have hypothesized a neglected link between normative cognition and model-based 
cognitive control of complex motor skill and craft skill. The link merits further exploration, 
but I hope I have done enough to motivate the first part of the skill hypothesis. I will now 
turn to the second part. If the link is as deep as I have proposed, we are looking at one 
evolutionary story, not two. Rather than thinking about the evolution of skill and the 
evolution of normative cognition as wholly separate topics, we should try to understand the 
evolution of norm-guided skill.  
 
Since the evolution of skill can be traced in the archaeological record, it is possible to 
construct an empirically credible account. In this section I present an account, informed by 
archaeological evidence, of how some core components of normative cognition may have 
evolved. 
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5.1 The great ape platform 
Which ingredients of normative cognition were already present in the last common ancestor 
of Pan and Homo? On the assumption that the last common ancestor was chimpanzee-like, 
studies of chimpanzees suggest that social emotions, such as anger and proto-shame, played a 
role in managing dominance hierarchies. Anger signalled a credible threat of retaliation in 
response to insubordination; proto-shame signalled submission to social superiors or the 
recognition of diminished rank (Fessler 1999; Maibom 2010). Early hominins11 kept track of 
social rank and conditioned their behaviour on rank.  
 
However, this is not guidance of behaviour by norms in anything like the human sense. There 
are at least large quantitative differences here, perhaps qualitative differences. The last 
common ancestor did not fluently self-regulate their behaviour to maintain conformity with 
socially learned, culturally variable norms. A human observer, looking in on these early 
hominins, might attribute primitive social norms, such as “don’t take food from a dominant”, 
but there is no need to for the hominins themselves to have cognitive control models of the 
situation in which these norms are encoded. All they need to do is recognize rank and 
condition behaviour on it. Model-free associative learning would be enough to learn a 
conditioned fear response to an angry alpha. 
 
There are, in chimpanzees, norm-like phenomena in the form of between-group differences 
that persist across generations due to social learning. These differences are sometimes called 
“traditions”. For example, chimpanzees in some populations display a distinctive “handclasp” 
behaviour when grooming each other. The style of the handclasp varies between groups, and 	
11 The term “hominin” encompasses the Homo genus and the australopithecines; in other words, modern humans 
and all ancestral species following the split from Pan. 
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chimpanzees learn and conform to the prevailing style of their group (van Leeuwen et al. 
2012). In one group, a high-ranking female started wearing a piece of grass on her ear, and 
other group members copied her (van Leeuwen et al. 2014). There are also between-group 
differences in tool preferences. Some chimpanzee groups prefer to crack nuts with stone 
hammers, others with wooden hammers, and groups also vary in the size of wooden hammer 
they prefer (Luncz et al. 2012).  
 
These cultural traditions are sometimes described as norms (e.g. Andrews 2009). However, 
there is no strong case for positing normative cognition to explain between-group differences. 
If the high-ranking individuals in a group prefer (for example) stone hammers, and juveniles 
differentially attend to high-ranking individuals, they may well come to associate the use of 
stone hammers with reward, and so acquire the same preference by model-free associative 
learning (Schlingoff and Moore 2017). Stable between-group differences alone do not imply 
normative cognition. 
 
In addition to social emotions, rank sensitivity and simple cultural traditions, there were basic 
capacities for skill learning (including social learning of skills) and skill execution. A 
capacity for motor action guided by internal models, largely encapsulated from cognition, 
may be a core function of the cerebellum with a deep evolutionary history (Wolpert et al. 
1998). But did the last common ancestor also possess cognitive control models, modelling the 
execution of a complex skill and anticipating the demands imposed by this particular 
situation? What is the behavioural marker of this more sophisticated form of action control?  
 
It helps here to return to our focal example of elite mountain biking: in this case, we find 
agents making on-the-fly adjustments to a learned technique in response to anticipated 
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challenges that are idiosyncratic to this situation (they are challenges posed by this bike on 
this terrain, and what is coming around this corner). It is this capacity for flexible adjustment 
to anticipated challenges unique to the present situation that we took to be evidence of 
cognitive control models. Do we find this in chimpanzees?   
 
Arguably the most sophisticated learned technique mastered by chimpanzees is ant dipping, 
in which chimpanzees use tools (such as short poles fashioned from the shrub Alchornea 
hirtella) to harvest army ants. Primatologists have documented several different methods of 
ant dipping, and chimpanzees are able to adjust their technique to the demands of the 
situation in a coarse-grained way (reviewed in Humle 2010). Key aspects of technique, such 
as the length of the tool, are adjusted to situational variables such as the species of the prey 
ant, and other aspects, such as the method of eating, are in turn adjusted to the length of the 
tool.  
 
However, what seems to be missing is evidence of flexibility in the face of anticipated, as 
opposed to observed, situational demands. Sensitivity to regular, recurring features of 
situations, such as the species of prey ant, may be achieved without a cognitive control model 
by having several discrete techniques available to the motor system, together with the use of 
perceptual cues to identify the general type of situation one is in. The paradigm here is 
grasping a cup: different types of handle require different grasping techniques, but this 
coarse-grained sensitivity to general types of situation is not the same as the ability to 
anticipate emerging challenges and problems. While the evidence is inconclusive, I 
hypothesize that cognitive control models are unique to the hominin lineage. 
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5.2 The elaboration of cognitive control 
Human cognitive evolution is a story of the dramatic expansion and enrichment of skill 
learning and skill execution capabilities, driven by feedback loops connecting social foraging, 
social learning and environmental change. Kim Sterelny (2012a) provides an account of how 
these feedback loops worked. In brief, hunting and gathering in a changing environment put 
an evolutionary premium on the social transmission of skill. Foragers needed to know what to 
hunt and gather and how to hunt and gather it, and in a changing environment the necessary 
skills changed too quickly to be genetically encoded.  
 
Under this selection pressure, hominins developed a form of master-apprentice learning. 
Early hominins, like modern-day apprentices, acquired skills from the preceding generation 
through a process of guided trial and error: juveniles would attempt to recreate adult 
activities, such as foraging and toolmaking, while adults would actively correct their mistakes 
and provide a structured programme of progressively more demanding challenges. These 
scaffolded learning environments were complemented by cognitive and life-history 
adaptations: adults evolved to be tolerant and supportive of apprentices, who evolved to learn 
by imitation from their role models during a protracted period of juvenile cognitive 
development. Each incremental increase in the bandwidth and volume of social learning led 
to incrementally more efficient social foraging, which in turn allowed for incrementally more 
protracted learning. Meanwhile, more efficient social foraging further accelerated the pace of 
environmental change, putting an even greater premium on the social learning of skill. 
 
The long-term results were extraordinary. An important milestone is Acheulean lithic 
technology. This technology, exemplified by the bifacial stone tools usually known as 
handaxes and cleavers (although their precise use is disputed), is thought to have been first 
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developed by early African Homo erectus and was used extensively by Homo 
heidelbergensis, the species often seen as the likely common ancestor of modern humans and 
the Neanderthals. Acheulean bifaces, especially late examples, show remarkable 
craftsmanship and symmetry (Lycett 2008; Iovita et al. 2017). Their manufacture was highly 
skilled and is usually taken to indicate a capacity for the precise guidance of action by 
socially acquired knowledge (Shipton 2010; Shipton and Nielsen 2015).12  
 
We see, in Acheulean bifaces, evidence that hominins could make flexible adjustments to a 
learned technique in response to anticipated, emerging problems. To craft such an object, one 
must be attuned to the idiosyncratic demands imposed by the shape, size and structure of this 
particular piece of stone, and one must be able to anticipate the problems it will pose. I 
hypothesize that, like skilled mountain biking, the craft of flint knapping is (and was, from at 
least the Acheulean onwards) guided by a cognitive control model: a model that represents 
the control parameters of the process and the likely downstream consequences of small 
adjustments to technique, allowing extremely consistent generation of a highly symmetric 
end-product despite wide variety in the situational demands imposed by the stone.13,14  
	
12 There is a dissenting view that is sceptical of a substantial role for social learning in explaining Acheulean 
toolmaking (Davidson 2002; Corbey et al. 2016; Tennie et al. 2017). Those sceptical about my claims regarding 
the Acheulean may still accept the core elements of the skill hypothesis, but they will regard the forms of 
toolmaking that indicate shared technical norms as appearing later in the archaeological record. 
13 Along similar lines, Sterelny (2012b) has argued that Acheulean handaxe manufacture was guided by 
“behaviour programs” and “inner templates” of the end product. I suggest these programs/templates can be 
assimilated to the notion of a cognitive control model. 
14 See Stout et al. (2015) and Putt et al. (2017) for neuroscientific evidence that Acheulean tool production 
engages mechanisms of cognitive control. Stout and collaborators have long argued for the importance of the 
Acheulean in human cognitive evolution (Stout et al. 2008; Stout 2011; Stout and Chaminade 2012). 
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FIGURE 1: Acheulean bifaces (drawing from the Victoria History of the County of Kent, Volume 1, ed. William 
Page, 1908, London: Archibald Constable and Company, p. 312.) 
 
5.3 The standardization of technique 
This is evidence, then, that the cognitive dimension of skill as seen in modern humans was in 
place by the Acheulean period.15 Is it also evidence of the affective dimension? I have argued 
	
15 I don’t rule out an earlier date of origin for cognitive control models. Oldowan tool production is much less 
complex, and provides less persuasive evidence of cognitive control and group-wide standardization (Ambrose 
2001; Wynn and McGrew 1989). But see Morgan et al. (2015) for arguments that the received wisdom about the 
Oldowan may have underestimated its complexity.	
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that the affective dimension of skill consists in affective pressure that motivates an agent to 
correct or forestall performance errors by modifying technique. In short, the performance 
feels wrong (or feels right). We can identify two plausible selection pressures for this 
affective dimension of skill.  
 
First, note that the manufacture of Acheulean bifaces was, in at least some cases, a 
collaborative activity involving a division of labour. Ceri Shipton and Mark Nielsen (2015) 
report evidence of spatial division of labour at a site in India, with the early stages and 
finishing stages of cleaver manufacture carried out at distinct locations. The best explanation, 
they argue, is that different group members were undertaking different tasks. Inherent to 
collaborative tool manufacture is a special kind of coordination problem resulting from the 
causal opacity of complex skills: individual agents at the early stages of the process will not 
be fully aware of what the finishers do, and consequently will not be fully aware of the 
downstream consequences of their actions. Small variations of technique in the early stages 
may result in the finisher receiving a tool that cannot be finished. The consequences of these 
variations will not be readily foreseeable unless the agents at the beginning of the production 
line have also mastered the skills to be performed later, which would undercut the advantages 
of dividing the labour. 
 
A solution to this problem is the standardization of technique: all agents involved in the 
process internalize a particular way of doing their part and conform to that way even when 
departures from it seem, from their point of view, inconsequential.16 There is archaeological 
	
16 Tomasello’s (2016) suggestion that the first norms were “role ideals” in joint action is probably compatible 
with my claims here, if we allow that toolmaking was an instance of a joint action. Shipton and Nielsen (2015) 
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evidence that techniques were indeed standardized at particular sites, with some variation 
between sites (Wynn 1993; Shipton 2010). These standardized techniques were passed down 
the generations with high fidelity. Standardization of a complex skill indicates not just 
cognitive control, but also a robust motivation to adhere to one particular style of skill 
execution among multiple possible styles.  
 
Standardization of technique is possible when agents internalize a particular style of skill 
execution, in the sense of feeling negative affective responses to small departures from a 
cognitive control model. I suggest that standardized toolmaking is an archaeological marker 
of norm-guided skill execution. Agents were, I suggest, internalizing technical norms—our 
ways of executing practical skills—and feeling negative affect when their performance failed 
to meet the group’s shared standards.  
 
What is the second selection pressure? Mastering a skill as complex as Acheulean tool 
manufacture requires years of sustained practice. This marks a significant watershed 
compared to anything observed earlier in the archaeological record. What motivates sustained 
practice? Mastering these skills would have yielded long-term fitness benefits, especially if 
high quality tools could be exchanged for other resources, but it is implausible to suppose 
that explicit knowledge of the long-term fitness benefits motivated practice. Given the long-
term fitness benefits and the difficulty of being motivated by them, selection would have 
favoured agents intrinsically motivated to master skills—agents who felt satisfaction in 
achieving excellence in skill execution, and discontent at anything short of excellence. 
	
discuss Acheulean tool manufacture as an early and important example of human collaboration, perhaps one 
involving joint intentionality in Tomasello’s sense.	
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Selection would have favoured mechanisms for targeting negative affect at those specific 
aspects of performance that required improvement. 
 
5.4 Social enrichment, teaching and a chicken-and-egg problem 
Standardized techniques of tool manufacture were “norms” in a broad sense: they provided a 
standard of correct performance to which a skilled toolmaker was intrinsically motivated to 
conform. They were also social in the sense of being coordinated across groups. But they 
need not have been social norms in a more demanding sense, which also connotes third-party 
monitoring, expectation and/or enforcement (Bicchieri 2005). These elaborations were, I 
suggest, connected to teaching. 
 
Hiscock (2014) argues that, given the risk of injury inherent in even very small errors, 
Acheulean tool manufacture already required intentional teaching. Effective teaching, as 
opposed to mere toleration of learners, relies on comparing the behaviour of others to one’s 
own control model: one must notice and foresee failures of skilled performance in the learner, 
and one must respond appropriately to these failures by signalling the nature of the failure, its 
seriousness, and the appropriate corrective measure.  
 
In cases where errors by a learner are foreseen and managed by a teacher, physical injury can 
be avoided: milder punishments and rewards administered by the teacher can take their place. 
We see in the evolution of teaching the first stage in the socialization of cognitive control: a 
good teacher models the actions of the learner, identifying mismatches between the learner’s 
performance and the predictions of the model, and responding with corrective measures to 
errors of performance. Having initially evolved for the self-regulation of behaviour, control 
models were co-opted for the regulation of the behaviour of other agents.   
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Admittedly, this suggestion faces a chicken-and-egg problem. How plausible is it that 
pedagogical contexts, in which a learner attends carefully to a model who tolerates their 
presence and supports their learning, arose prior to widespread enforcement of social norms? 
In contemporary humans, pedagogy is a richly norm-governed activity. We instil in children 
norms of respect for teachers, and we have a normative expectation that adults will tolerate, 
and help to correct, the mistakes of children. If norms arose first in the context of toolmaking, 
and only later expanded outwards to other domains, we have to assume that pedagogical 
contexts initially arose without the enforcement of pedagogical norms of respect for teachers 
and tolerance of learners.  This is a potential problem for any account which begins with self-
regulation in the context of skill execution, moves from there to other-regulation in the 
context of skill transmission, and from there to more general, more abstract social norms.  
 
My response is that methods of proto-teaching in the Acheulean would not have placed 
anything like as much strain on the agents’ normative capacities as contemporary methods of 
teaching. Teaching in modern human societies typically involves groups of learners, taught 
by teachers who are neither their relatives nor their co-residents. The group size strains the 
learners’ attentional capacities, and cooperating with non-relatives and non-co-residents 
strains their emotional capacities, leading in turn to strain on the teacher’s capacity for 
tolerance. Norm enforcement is necessary to stabilize the situation. The challenges, for both 
teachers and learners, of regulating their emotions in the classroom have been well 
documented by education researchers (Sutton 2004; Graziano et al. 2007; Gullone et al. 
2010). By contrast, the transmission of skill in the Acheulean would have occurred between 
models and learners who were, if not closely related, then at least co-resident in the same 
camp. Even now, in contemporary hunter-gatherer societies, craft skills are often transmitted 
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primarily from parents to offspring, usually from the same-sex parent (Hewlett and Cavalli-
Sforza 1986; Shennan and Steele 1998; Shennan 2002; Mameli 2008). Prosocial dispositions 
towards campmates and kin would have been enough to stabilize simple forms of teaching, 
based on the demonstration of skills, prior to the enforcement of pedagogical norms.  
 
5.5 The repurposing of shame 
While these gradual transformations were in progress, there was also a transformation in the 
affective salience of norm violations. In the context of skilled toolmaking, directed discontent 
plays an important role (a skilled knapper sees errors and is motivated to correct them) but 
this affective response need not take the form of shame or outrage. As noted in Section 2, 
proto-shame and anger plausibly originated in dominance hierarchies, where they regulate 
social rank (Fessler 1999); in hominins, these emotions were co-opted for the regulation of 
prestige hierarchies (Fessler 2004, 2007).  
 
As obligate collaborators, early humans constantly evaluated each other as prospective 
partners in collaborative enterprises, including toolmaking, and reputation management was 
crucial for success (Baumard 2016; Tomasello 2016). Initially, these evaluations need not 
have involved normative standards: they may simply have been predictive judgements about 
how likely a potential partner is to succeed at some task. Agents would prefer cooperative 
partners with a track record of success. But as normative cognition became more 
sophisticated for the reasons suggested above, these evaluations would have acquired a 
normative dimension. Once agents were monitoring each other’s behaviour for conformity 
with an internalized standard, it became possible to judge another agent to be doing things the 
wrong way, independently of any manifest, visible failures that resulted from the error. 
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Shame and anger acquired new functions in this context: they became a means of signalling 
recognition that one’s own performance, or the performance of another, fell severely short of 
the group’s shared internalized standards, and a means of motivating improvement. Falling 
short of the standard in the presence of others triggers shame in oneself and anger in others, 
and these affective responses provide a strong motivation to do better next time.  
 
5.6 The expansion of the normative domain 
All of this, I hypothesize, was there in the Acheulean period, prior to the origin of lexically 
rich languages, cumulative cultural evolution, or behaviourally modern practices such as 
ritual or artistic creativity, all of which plausibly require a pre-existing capacity for norm-
guided skilled action. However, normative cognition at this stage remains restricted to a core 
set of socially learned skills: it is far from a ubiquitous feature of human social life. I 
hypothesize that this ubiquity was a later development. The pervasiveness of social norms in 
micromanaging all aspects of social conduct brought with it norms of kinship, norms of ritual 
and religion, and much more demanding norms of fairness. I suggest that these norms, 
despite their apparently abstract and general character, may have been an elaboration of a 
basic capacity for norm-guided skill execution. 
 
How so? Sterelny (2014) has argued that the expansion of the normative domain was driven 
by the “Palaeolithic reciprocation crisis”: a package of coordination problems resulting from 
the demands of reciprocity in expanding social groups. Larger groups favour greater 
specialization: in a late Pleistocene “tribal” network of 500 or more individuals there might, 
for example, be market for a full-time specialist toolmaker or spear-thrower. But 
specialization requires reciprocal exchange (e.g. of tools for food), and reciprocal exchange 
requires norms of market value: one must know how much food a handaxe is worth, for 
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example. These norms, although apparently quite abstract, may have begun as norms of 
skilled behaviour in specific situations: norms of how to barter skilfully round the campfire, 
norms of what to offer and what to accept in one-on-one interaction. Meanwhile, simple 
norms of fairness plausibly arose in the context of collaborative hunting: skilful execution of 
a hunt would flow into skilful division of the spoils, guided by norms of equitable division 
that benefited the agent, in the long run, by showing them to be a trustworthy cooperation 
partner (Baumard 2016).  
 
Larger groups also faced the problem of creating group cohesion by means other than one-
on-one bonding (Dunbar 2014). The solution was ritual: skilful collective performances, high 
in emotional and mnemonic resonance. It is easy to see how norms of ritual might have 
begun as norms of skill execution: norms of how to dance, or make music, our way. 
Moreover, at some of these rituals, inter-band monogamous pairings would be arranged, 
guided by norms of kinship: norms of who can pair with whom (Chapais 2008; Allen et al. 
2011). On the face of it, kinship norms are among the most abstract norms, specifying (for 
example) that one may marry a cross-cousin but not a parallel cousin. However, the first 
kinship norms may have been norms of skill execution in group rituals: a skilled performer 
knows where to go, whom to dance with, which moiety (i.e. descent group) to attach to, and 
is led by norms of ritual behaviour to an appropriate mating partner.  
 
In short, behaviourally modern humans evolved elaborate systems of abstract norms 
encompassing trade, ritual and family life, but I hypothesize that these norms were learned, 
stored and executed using mechanisms that had originally evolved for the standardization and 
teaching of toolmaking techniques. 
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6. Comparison to Other Hypotheses 
 
Normative cognition is a complex adaptation, assembled incrementally over many thousands 
of generations, and any adequate explanation of its evolution must appeal to a sustained 
selection pressure over a long period of time. The skill hypothesis proposes that the demands 
of toolmaking provided such pressure. In sum, this is because Acheulean and post-Acheulean 
toolmaking is a complex skill with multiple possible styles of execution, calling for (i) 
sophisticated mechanisms of model-based cognitive control, (ii) group-wide standardization 
of technique through technical norms, and (iii) years of sustained practice, driven by an 
intrinsic motivation to achieve an internalized standard of correct performance. The demands 
of standardization and practice selected for cognitive changes that made them easier, enabling 
yet higher levels of standardization and yet more demanding practice regimes. Normative 
cognition was the adaptation that facilitated the standardization and practice of our ways of 
performing complex practical skills. This is an example of a “gene-culture co-evolution” 
hypothesis (Boyd and Richerson 1985). 
 
It is worth comparing this idea with other possible gene-culture co-evolution hypotheses: 
those which posit a role for forms of mutualistic cooperation other than toolmaking, and 
those which posit a crucial role for altruism and punishment. There is no big disagreement 
here about the importance of cooperation for the evolution of normative cognition, or the 
importance of gene-culture co-evolution, but there is disagreement about the type of 
cooperation that mattered most. 
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6.1 Other cooperative activities 
The skill hypothesis proposes that normative cognition evolved in response to the demands of 
complex skills that required years of sustained practice and groupwide standardization of 
technique. I see an important role for Acheulean toolmaking because it seems, to me, the 
earliest example of a skill with the requisite features. But I remain open to the possibility that 
other collaborative activities were at least as important, and also possessed the required 
features. The article could just as well have been called “Complex Motor/Craft Skill and the 
Origin of Normative Cognition”. Big game hunting—another demanding collaborative 
activity requiring at least some division of labour—is another example of a complex motor 
skill that may have the required features.  
 
However, the skill hypothesis predicts that not any form of mutualistic cooperation selects for 
normative cognition, because not any form of mutualistic cooperation will involve a complex 
skill with the right features. The skill hypothesis proposes that it was the need to standardize 
technique and to motivate practice that initially selected for the internalization of normative 
standards of correct performance. On this hypothesis, normative cognition evolved, as 
Tomasello (2016) and Baumard (2010) have also suggested, in the context of skilful 
mutualistic cooperation. But it was not the mutualistic or cooperative character of the 
behaviour that generated the selection pressure for technical norms: it was its skilful 
character. 
 
6.2 Altruism 
Existing approaches often link the evolution of normative cognition to the evolution of 
altruism (e.g. Joyce 2006; Kitcher 2011). The general idea is that normative cognition 
evolved to make us more altruistic or to “remedy altruism failures” (Kitcher 2011, p. 135). 
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The skill hypothesis is compatible with the idea that, once early humans had a fairly 
sophisticated capacity for normative cognition, one of the things they could do with it was 
internalize norms of altruism. What it rejects is the idea that a need to be more altruistic was 
an initial driver of the evolution of normative cognition. 
 
One problem with the “altruism failures” hypothesis is that many norms, including highly 
robust norms such as incest prohibitions, have nothing to do with altruism (Sripada 2005; 
Sripada and Stich 2006; Machery and Mallon 2010). However, many norms have nothing to 
do with skill either. It is part of the skill hypothesis that the normative domain gradually 
expanded beyond technical norms to encompass more abstract domains via norms of ritual 
and collaborative activity. A defender of the altruism failures hypothesis could argue, in a 
similar vein, that the normative domain gradually expanded beyond altruism failures to 
encompass non-altruistic norms.  
 
A different problem is that altruism, in the psychologist’s sense of action motivated by 
concern for others, does not require normative cognition: what it requires is sympathy, 
bonding and trust (Sterelny 2012c, pp. 103-4). Altruism-based accounts of the evolution of 
normative cognition thus face the question: If the problem was a need to boost altruism, why 
did natural selection not just enhance sympathy, bonding and trust? Selection for variants 
that dialled up these emotions would have solved the problem of altruism failures more 
directly and effectively than normative cognition. This too is not a decisive refutation of the 
“altruism failures” hypothesis. Sometimes natural selection assembles overcomplicated 
solutions to design problems. But it is unsatisfying to regard normative cognition as nothing 
more than an overcomplicated way of solving a problem that could have been solved by fine-
tuning an existing mechanism. The skill hypothesis shows there were design problems—the 
	 33 
need to standardize technique across groups and to motivate sustained practice—to which the 
distinctive features of normative cognition provide a solution. 
 
6.3 Punishment 
Some existing approaches also link normative cognition to the evolution of punishment 
(Sripada 2005; Machery and Mallon 2010; Kitcher 2011, pp. 90-91). The idea is that 
normative cognition evolved to help individuals evade punishment from others. For example, 
Kitcher writes: 
 
Suppose a type of altruism failure, keeping food items for oneself, say, regularly elicits 
aggressive retaliation from others. Chimpanzees and hominids could recognize the 
regularity, thus allowing for variants who recognize the potential threats to them if they 
fail to share, and whose fear generates compliance. (Kitcher 2011, p. 90) 
 
For Kitcher (2011), the punishment hypothesis and the “altruism failures” hypothesis are 
complementary: altruism failures have adverse fitness consequences because they elicit 
punishment. The skill hypothesis is compatible with the suggestion that, once early humans 
had a sophisticated capacity for normative cognition, one of the things they could do with it 
was internalize norms of what to punish and how to punish it. It denies, however, that pre-
existing punishment practices were an initial driver of the evolution of normative cognition. 
 
If we are talking about cognitively sophisticated forms of punishment, in which the 
perpetrator is judged to have violated a norm, then these capacities presuppose normative 
cognition and cannot pre-date it (Sterelny 2012c, p. 105). If, however, we are talking about 
very simple punishment-like phenomena, such as retaliation in a dominance hierarchy, we 
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again face the problem that normative cognition would have been an overcomplicated 
solution to the problem. Model-free associative learning allows agents to learn associations 
between certain types of action and retaliation. If the problem is insufficient fear of alphas, a 
direct and effective solution is to dial up fear of alphas. We should again note that natural 
selection sometimes assembles overcomplicated solutions to design problems. But again, it is 
an advantage of the skill hypothesis that it does not involve the same kind of mismatch 
between the features of normative cognition and the design problem it initially solved. 
 
6.4 Language: precondition or consequence? 
Some accounts of the evolution of normative or moral cognition assume that language is 
already on the scene and take their explanatory target to be language-dependent (Gibbard 
1990; Joyce 2006). By contrast, language plays no significant role in the skill hypothesis, and 
the elements of normative cognition the hypothesis aims to explain are language-
independent. We do not know when language originated, but there is no reason to suppose 
the manufacture of Acheulean bifaces required it (Putt et al. 2014).17 The same goes for 
teaching and the group-wide standardization of technique: these things may require 
signalling, but the signalling may be entirely gestural. The story is compatible with an origin 
for language long after the basic elements of normative cognition were in place. This is just 
as well, since language is itself a richly norm-guided skill, and accounts that assume it to be 
there at the beginning, like accounts that assume sophisticated punishment practices, face a 
chicken-and-egg problem. 
 
	
17 Some have, however, suggested that skilled toolmaking might have enabled and driven the evolution of 
language (e.g. Stout and Chaminade 2012; Sterelny 2012b). 
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6.5 Is sociality necessary? 
A final question the skill hypothesis brings into view is whether normative cognition could 
only ever have evolved in a richly cooperative species, or whether its evolution was only 
contingently entangled with the evolution of cooperation. Consider an intelligent but non-
social animal, such as an octopus. Could an octopus evolve normative cognition?  
 
The received wisdom, I take it, is that it could not: normative cognition is a response to 
distinctive demands imposed by social life. The punishment hypothesis and the “altruism 
failures” hypothesis endorse this claim. Yet the skill hypothesis suggests it may be too quick. 
A non-social but intelligent creature might still stand to gain from learning the right way to 
manufacture a complex tool. If the process takes months or years to master, there might also 
be selection for an intrinsic motivation to practice and improve in relation to an internalized 
standard of correct performance. If complex tool manufacture becomes ecologically central 
to this creature’s way of life, we would expect to see cognitive changes evolving in response, 
and these cognitive changes might resemble human normative cognition in some respects, 
while differing in others—since the groupwide standardization of technique would not be an 
issue. I am not suggesting this has happened, only that it could happen. The evolution of 
normative cognition might not necessarily require sociality, even though the relationship in 
our own case is close. 
 
7. Looking for Archaeological Evidence 
 
In Section 3, I argued that the first part of the hypothesis—the proposed link between the 
psychology of norms and the psychology of skills—could be tested empirically. The same 
applies to the evolutionary part of the skill hypothesis. This part makes claims about the 
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relationship between the evolution of norms and the evolution of skills that can be tested 
against the archaeological record.  
 
The central empirical prediction is that technical norms (and especially norms of toolmaking) 
should not post-date more abstract norms of ritual, reciprocity, fairness and kinship. It would 
count against the hypothesis if there are examples of societies with very simple technical 
norms but highly complex, highly abstract social norms. The prediction is that the complexity 
of the technical and non-technical norms a society can support should be correlated. Abstract 
social norms, such as norms of kinship, should be such that they could, at least initially, have 
been enacted as norms of skilled performance in a specific context, such as a ritual. 
 
In sum, although it has yet to receive serious empirical attention, I have made a case that the 
skill hypothesis is consilient with recent trends in the psychology of skill and compatible with 
existing data on the archaeology of skill. By bringing out a neglected connection between the 
psychology of skill and the psychology of norms, the hypothesis opens up new lines of 
investigation for cognitive science, archaeology and evolutionary anthropology. 
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